Signed RHRP Paul Shuey to a minor-league contract; Invited him to Spring Training
Shuey is probably done thanks to all the injuries, but if you're the Indians, why not bring him in? His degenerative hip isn't going to go away, and he also is coming off a thumb injury, so he's a real longshot to make the team. His strikeout rates had been going down even before missing the 2004 season, so I'm really tempering my expectations. He's not yet to the Jason Bere setting on the toaster (burnt to a crisp), but his career outlook is getting slightly golden brown. Shapiro likes to take care of his former players, and Shuey is by all accounts a great guy to have on your team. I just don't know if he can pitch anymore.
Signed OF Darnell McDonald to a minor-league contract; Invited him to Spring Training
The second Orioles bust signed this offseason (Jose Morban), McDonald is a former 1st round pick who never developed any power. Now that he's been cut loose by the Orioles, he'll have to ply his trade as a "veteren" minor-league outfielder. He posted a .662 OPS in AAA last year, which is not a good sign considering he's coming off shoulder surgery. He doesn't have the speed or range to play center field, so it looks like he's going to be either Buffalo's or Akron's reserve outfielder.
Writings about the Cleveland Indians and other completely unrelated things
Saturday, January 29, 2005
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
Projecting Ground-Ball Pitchers
This issue has been puzzling me for a while, and the Westbrook signing really brought it to the forefront. Given Westbrook's method of pitching, is it fair to exact him to the same evaluation methods that we apply other more conventional hurlers to? First, let's examine Jake's peripherals, which are usually the most useful in making predictions.
Strikeouts per 9 innings: 4.8
For the average pitcher, this isn't really an encouraging sign. The ability to strike out hitters is the surest way of run prevention, and pitchers with lower strikeout ratios have a lower margin for error in allowing runs.
Walks per 9 innings: 2.6
This is pretty good. Westbrook finished 14th in the AL in BB/9, which doesn't really signify anything by itself.
Hits per 9 innings: 8.7
Above average numbers here, but nothing to get excited over.
Home Runs per 9 innings: 0.79
This is pretty good. Jacobs Field has been a fairly neutral park in recent seasons, so I'll just assume that this ratio doesn't need to be adjusted much.
DIPS ERA: 4.19
DIPS stands for Defense Independent Defense Statistics. This is, essentially, Westbrook's ERA independent of his defense. Given that his ERA was .90 runs lower than his dERA, this is a red flag. This seems to indicate Westbrook was lucky last season.
BABIP: .263
BABIP stands for "Batting Average of Balls in Play". This is the "batting average" of balls put in play. And like the dERA, the BABIP indicates Westbrook was lucky with where where his pitches were hit.
SLG% Against: .386
This is an encouraging sign. This is the slugging percentage of the batters that faced him last season, and it's the 4th best in the league. This indicates the hits Westbrook did allow were more likely to be singles than extra-base hits.
GB/FB Ratio: 2.72
Westbrook only trailed Derek Lowe in this category.
What does all this indicate? First of all, Westbrook was pretty lucky last season, and his ERA is likely to go up. But I'm wondering out loud if Westbrook's sinker causes more "weak contact" than the average pitcher. I watched most of his starts in 2004, and when he was on, hitters couldn't hit the ball with any authority, and most of the time any contact resulted in weak grounders to short or second. DIPS ERA uses the assumption that MLB pitchers do not differ greatly on their ability to prevent hits on balls in play, but there are a couple possible exceptions. One is a knuckball pitcher, whose general goal is to keep hitters off balance. Another one could be extreme groundball pitchers, who try to pitch to "weak contact" by throwing heavy sinkers. I don't know of any way to substantiate this, so for now this is a just a wild theory. I'll peg Westbrook for an ERA of 4.25 or so next season based on his peripherals, but I'll also be interested to see if his BABIP changes appreciably. Obviously to be successful with a strikeout rate of 5.0 or less, a pitcher has to keep his walks down as well as keep the running game under control, both of which Jake did in 2004. But if his BABIP continues to stay low, it may indicate that his sinker is good enough almost by itself to make Westbrook a valuable pitcher.
Sources: ESPN, STATS, Inc.
Strikeouts per 9 innings: 4.8
For the average pitcher, this isn't really an encouraging sign. The ability to strike out hitters is the surest way of run prevention, and pitchers with lower strikeout ratios have a lower margin for error in allowing runs.
Walks per 9 innings: 2.6
This is pretty good. Westbrook finished 14th in the AL in BB/9, which doesn't really signify anything by itself.
Hits per 9 innings: 8.7
Above average numbers here, but nothing to get excited over.
Home Runs per 9 innings: 0.79
This is pretty good. Jacobs Field has been a fairly neutral park in recent seasons, so I'll just assume that this ratio doesn't need to be adjusted much.
DIPS ERA: 4.19
DIPS stands for Defense Independent Defense Statistics. This is, essentially, Westbrook's ERA independent of his defense. Given that his ERA was .90 runs lower than his dERA, this is a red flag. This seems to indicate Westbrook was lucky last season.
BABIP: .263
BABIP stands for "Batting Average of Balls in Play". This is the "batting average" of balls put in play. And like the dERA, the BABIP indicates Westbrook was lucky with where where his pitches were hit.
SLG% Against: .386
This is an encouraging sign. This is the slugging percentage of the batters that faced him last season, and it's the 4th best in the league. This indicates the hits Westbrook did allow were more likely to be singles than extra-base hits.
GB/FB Ratio: 2.72
Westbrook only trailed Derek Lowe in this category.
What does all this indicate? First of all, Westbrook was pretty lucky last season, and his ERA is likely to go up. But I'm wondering out loud if Westbrook's sinker causes more "weak contact" than the average pitcher. I watched most of his starts in 2004, and when he was on, hitters couldn't hit the ball with any authority, and most of the time any contact resulted in weak grounders to short or second. DIPS ERA uses the assumption that MLB pitchers do not differ greatly on their ability to prevent hits on balls in play, but there are a couple possible exceptions. One is a knuckball pitcher, whose general goal is to keep hitters off balance. Another one could be extreme groundball pitchers, who try to pitch to "weak contact" by throwing heavy sinkers. I don't know of any way to substantiate this, so for now this is a just a wild theory. I'll peg Westbrook for an ERA of 4.25 or so next season based on his peripherals, but I'll also be interested to see if his BABIP changes appreciably. Obviously to be successful with a strikeout rate of 5.0 or less, a pitcher has to keep his walks down as well as keep the running game under control, both of which Jake did in 2004. But if his BABIP continues to stay low, it may indicate that his sinker is good enough almost by itself to make Westbrook a valuable pitcher.
Sources: ESPN, STATS, Inc.
Tuesday, January 25, 2005
It's Over
Signed RHSP Jake Westbrook to a two-year, $7.5M contract, avoiding arbitration
This deal I can handle. Like with Blake's deal, the Indians have a 2007 club option. I don't know whether Westbrook will be eligible for free agency after the 2006 season, but judging by the terms of the contract, I'll assume that he wouldn't have his 6 years of service in until after 2007. Because free agency is based on service time, it's difficult to know whether a guy like Westbrook, who bounced back and forth between Cleveland and the minors the past several season, will be a free agent in 2006 or 2007.
Westbrook, like Blake, is due for a regression next year. Unlike Blake, I think Westbrook will be worth his contract. Jake's style of pitching means that he's subject to more variability in his numbers than a strikeout pitcher, but his sinker is good enough to make him a solid middle-of-the-rotation starter if healthy. Given the market for starting pitching, Westbrook at $2.9M this season and $4.25M in 2006 is a pretty good value even if his ERA climbs back to the 4.00 range.
With Westbrook's signing, the Indians have taken care of all their major offseason business. Shapiro has hinted that he'll try to sign a couple younger players to long-term deals (Martinez and Hafner come to mind), but that usually happens in Spring Training.
This deal I can handle. Like with Blake's deal, the Indians have a 2007 club option. I don't know whether Westbrook will be eligible for free agency after the 2006 season, but judging by the terms of the contract, I'll assume that he wouldn't have his 6 years of service in until after 2007. Because free agency is based on service time, it's difficult to know whether a guy like Westbrook, who bounced back and forth between Cleveland and the minors the past several season, will be a free agent in 2006 or 2007.
Westbrook, like Blake, is due for a regression next year. Unlike Blake, I think Westbrook will be worth his contract. Jake's style of pitching means that he's subject to more variability in his numbers than a strikeout pitcher, but his sinker is good enough to make him a solid middle-of-the-rotation starter if healthy. Given the market for starting pitching, Westbrook at $2.9M this season and $4.25M in 2006 is a pretty good value even if his ERA climbs back to the 4.00 range.
With Westbrook's signing, the Indians have taken care of all their major offseason business. Shapiro has hinted that he'll try to sign a couple younger players to long-term deals (Martinez and Hafner come to mind), but that usually happens in Spring Training.
Saturday, January 22, 2005
Player Evaluation Case Study - Casey Blake
I had intended to answer yesterday's question by using theoretical players. Now I'll use Casey Blake instead.
Re-signed OF Casey Blake to a two-year, $5.4M contract, avoiding arbitration
Blake was a "super-two," meaning he was arbitration-eligible even though he had less than three seasons worth of service time. The Indians, if they choose, have Blake for four more seasons. Casey is not your typical arbitration player; he's one of the older players on the roster, and before the 2003 season, only baseball junkies knew who he was. He started his career with the Toronto Blue Jays, drafted as a senior out of Wichita State. He got a cup of coffee with the Jays, but he couldn't crack the major-league roster. He then moved to Minnesota, to Baltimore, and back to Minnesota, and had accumulated a grand total of 49 major-league at-bats before the Indians invited him to Spring Training. He beat out Greg LaRocca (who?) and hasn't looked back. Now he's guaranteed $5.4M over the next two seasons, probably more than he's made his entire professional career put together.
My question is whether giving Blake two years is worth it. He's moving to the outfield, where you almost have to expect Blake to repeat his 2004 season in order to be a productive outfielder. I really don't see Blake doing that, though. His 2004 numbers are completely out of whack compared to what he did in the minors and in 2003. Yes, he hasn't gotten a real chance before now, but at age 31, his career shouldn't be compared to guys like Victor Martinez or Travis Hafner, both of whom have better minor-league resumes and who are on the better side of 30. The Indians made this decision based on Blake's intangibles, saying that his work ethic and his attitude had a large say in the two-year deal. That's all very nice, but you still have the data to contend with. I wouldn't categorize Blake's output in 2004 as a Brady Anderson-sized fluke, but at the same time you have to expect some kind of regression next season. The Indians are compounding this by moving him to left field, where a team's best offensive outfielder usually resides. Relying on Blake to repeat what may be a career year just to be an average outfielder isn't a gamble that's likely to pay off. For instance, let's see where Blake's 2003 and 2004 OPSs would have placed him among 2004 AL left fielders:
Manny Ramirez 1.010
Hideki Matsui .912
Carlos Lee .891
Jose Guillen .848
Casey Blake .839 (2004)
Lew Ford .826
Shannon Stewart .826
Raul Ibanez .825
Craig Monroe .825
Eric Byrnes .814
Rondell White .790
Matt Lawton .787
Carl Crawford .779
Larry Bigbie .766
Eric Young .754
Casey Blake .723 (2003)
Reed Johnson .698
Essentially, if Blake is as good in 2005 as he was in 2004, he's a pretty decent player, even for a left fielder. If, however, he reverts back to his 2003 form....well, let's just hope he doesn't do that. Which is why I don't like this signing. If Aaron Boone stays healthy and Blake regresses to his earlier self, there's a big problem. He's not a good enough defender to play second base, and if he's not adequate as a left fielder, he definitely wouldn't meet the offensive standards that's expected of a first baseman.
Getting back to yesterday's question....no, I would not give that fictious player a salary commensurate of a 100 T player, because more than likely, he won't be a 100 T player over the life of his contract. Because the player's age says that 2004 was more of a fluke than a legitimate break-out, it's not likely that the player will even maintain his T level next season. In this real-life situation, the medium involved is arbitration, which is a different environment to work in. The Indians weren't going to lose Blake if they didn't agree to a deal before the arbitration hearing, and given the figures submitted by Blake and the Indians, his 2005 salary wouldn't be a whole lot different if the two sides had gone to arbitration. But the guarenteed second year means that the Indians may be paying $3.05M for a player without a position in 2006. Like Rotoworld said, Blake is a player you really need to go year-to-year with. Which makes this move the first real dud of the offseason for the Indians.
Re-signed OF Casey Blake to a two-year, $5.4M contract, avoiding arbitration
Blake was a "super-two," meaning he was arbitration-eligible even though he had less than three seasons worth of service time. The Indians, if they choose, have Blake for four more seasons. Casey is not your typical arbitration player; he's one of the older players on the roster, and before the 2003 season, only baseball junkies knew who he was. He started his career with the Toronto Blue Jays, drafted as a senior out of Wichita State. He got a cup of coffee with the Jays, but he couldn't crack the major-league roster. He then moved to Minnesota, to Baltimore, and back to Minnesota, and had accumulated a grand total of 49 major-league at-bats before the Indians invited him to Spring Training. He beat out Greg LaRocca (who?) and hasn't looked back. Now he's guaranteed $5.4M over the next two seasons, probably more than he's made his entire professional career put together.
My question is whether giving Blake two years is worth it. He's moving to the outfield, where you almost have to expect Blake to repeat his 2004 season in order to be a productive outfielder. I really don't see Blake doing that, though. His 2004 numbers are completely out of whack compared to what he did in the minors and in 2003. Yes, he hasn't gotten a real chance before now, but at age 31, his career shouldn't be compared to guys like Victor Martinez or Travis Hafner, both of whom have better minor-league resumes and who are on the better side of 30. The Indians made this decision based on Blake's intangibles, saying that his work ethic and his attitude had a large say in the two-year deal. That's all very nice, but you still have the data to contend with. I wouldn't categorize Blake's output in 2004 as a Brady Anderson-sized fluke, but at the same time you have to expect some kind of regression next season. The Indians are compounding this by moving him to left field, where a team's best offensive outfielder usually resides. Relying on Blake to repeat what may be a career year just to be an average outfielder isn't a gamble that's likely to pay off. For instance, let's see where Blake's 2003 and 2004 OPSs would have placed him among 2004 AL left fielders:
Manny Ramirez 1.010
Hideki Matsui .912
Carlos Lee .891
Jose Guillen .848
Casey Blake .839 (2004)
Lew Ford .826
Shannon Stewart .826
Raul Ibanez .825
Craig Monroe .825
Eric Byrnes .814
Rondell White .790
Matt Lawton .787
Carl Crawford .779
Larry Bigbie .766
Eric Young .754
Casey Blake .723 (2003)
Reed Johnson .698
Essentially, if Blake is as good in 2005 as he was in 2004, he's a pretty decent player, even for a left fielder. If, however, he reverts back to his 2003 form....well, let's just hope he doesn't do that. Which is why I don't like this signing. If Aaron Boone stays healthy and Blake regresses to his earlier self, there's a big problem. He's not a good enough defender to play second base, and if he's not adequate as a left fielder, he definitely wouldn't meet the offensive standards that's expected of a first baseman.
Getting back to yesterday's question....no, I would not give that fictious player a salary commensurate of a 100 T player, because more than likely, he won't be a 100 T player over the life of his contract. Because the player's age says that 2004 was more of a fluke than a legitimate break-out, it's not likely that the player will even maintain his T level next season. In this real-life situation, the medium involved is arbitration, which is a different environment to work in. The Indians weren't going to lose Blake if they didn't agree to a deal before the arbitration hearing, and given the figures submitted by Blake and the Indians, his 2005 salary wouldn't be a whole lot different if the two sides had gone to arbitration. But the guarenteed second year means that the Indians may be paying $3.05M for a player without a position in 2006. Like Rotoworld said, Blake is a player you really need to go year-to-year with. Which makes this move the first real dud of the offseason for the Indians.
Friday, January 21, 2005
Player Evaluation - An Introduction
In today's economic environment, good player evaluation is a vital component of a successful organization. I would define the term as follows: the rating of baseball players. Now of course this rating system has many factors in it. Also, different rating systems have to used for different types of players, ie a team probably won't use the same criteria to rate a possible free agent target and a high school senior. For my purposes, I'm going to use a fictious measure, T, to serve as an example through the subsequent parts of this series. T stands for Talent, a term used often but never explained. Also assume that as T goes up, the value provided to the organization increases proportionally.
Now the trick is, if you're the GM, to place a T measure on a player. At the major-league level, this isn't too difficult. Since at the major-league level everyone's numbers are relevent, you can use statistical analysis for the offense, and teams usually have their own defensive measures to use. I should however differentiate between current value and projected value, which is a totally different animal. Current value is what a particular player is worth at a given point in time. This is useful for in-season moves such as rental trades. The more tricky measure, projected value, comes into play when teams are looking at a player in the long-term view. In this instance, age is a huge factor, as well as career trends and peripheral statistics from the past couple of years. Let's say that a player is worth 100 T as of the last day of the season. However, this player is a free agent, and the team is pondering whether they should pay him what he's asking for. Let's assume that the these are the players' previous T rankings:
2001: 80 T (Age 28)
2002: 70 T (Age 29)
2003: 75 T (Age 30)
2004: 100 T (Age 31)
Because the player's 100 T season happened to coincide with his walk year, he expects to be paid as a 100 T player. Also assume that his walks and strikeouts in 2004 did not differ dramatically from his previous three seasons. What do you as GM do?
I'll give you my answer, along with the various facets that went into it, tomorrow.
Now the trick is, if you're the GM, to place a T measure on a player. At the major-league level, this isn't too difficult. Since at the major-league level everyone's numbers are relevent, you can use statistical analysis for the offense, and teams usually have their own defensive measures to use. I should however differentiate between current value and projected value, which is a totally different animal. Current value is what a particular player is worth at a given point in time. This is useful for in-season moves such as rental trades. The more tricky measure, projected value, comes into play when teams are looking at a player in the long-term view. In this instance, age is a huge factor, as well as career trends and peripheral statistics from the past couple of years. Let's say that a player is worth 100 T as of the last day of the season. However, this player is a free agent, and the team is pondering whether they should pay him what he's asking for. Let's assume that the these are the players' previous T rankings:
2001: 80 T (Age 28)
2002: 70 T (Age 29)
2003: 75 T (Age 30)
2004: 100 T (Age 31)
Because the player's 100 T season happened to coincide with his walk year, he expects to be paid as a 100 T player. Also assume that his walks and strikeouts in 2004 did not differ dramatically from his previous three seasons. What do you as GM do?
I'll give you my answer, along with the various facets that went into it, tomorrow.
Wednesday, January 19, 2005
Transactions Aplenty
Signed IF Alex Cora to a two-year, $2.7M contract
Believe it or not, this is the first multi-year contract given out by the Indians since the 2001-2002 offseason, when CC Sabathia, Bob Wickman, and Matt Lawton were given contract extensions and Ricky Gutierrez was signed as a free agent. Technically, Aaron Boone's deal is a multi-year contract, but he didn't actually play for the team last season. Given that whoever lost the battle between Brandon Phillips and Jhonny Peralta wasn't going to be a backup, adding Cora to the mix is a nice insurance policy. Hopefully it isn't too attractive to Eric Wedge, who may be tempted to bench Peralta if he goes through an extended slump. If Cora is used like the team says they're going use him, he should be a nice complementary part. In a previous post, I said that Cora's main asset is his defense. He also is a left-handed hitter, which I previously alluded too but failed to mention explicity. Cora's main job should be to give Belliard one or two days off a week, and spot Peralta once in a while. He can be used in a late-inning situation when defense is a priority. Heck, he may become Jake Westbrook's personal infielder.
Whither Brandon Phillips, assuming he does lose out to Peralta? Back to Buffalo, where he'll probably play shortstop most of the time. The Indians have an option on Belliard, but I get the sense that it won't get picked up based on Shapiro said during today's conference call. That leaves second base open to Phillips, Cora, or both in 2006. Unless Brandon Pinckney makes gigantic strides next season, it looks like the job will be Phillips' to lose. Also, Peralta may eventually grow out of the shortstop position, possibly moving to third base, so Phillips, thanks to his quasi-rebound in 2004, still has a future with the club.
Also in today's press conference Shapiro said that Jose Hernandez would be more of utility player, playing first, third, left or even center field against a left-handed pitcher. Blake, although he's a right-handed hitter, tended to struggle against southpaws; he posted an OPS of only .785 against left-handers in 2004, compared to .865 against right-handers. That added to the possibility that 2004 may have been a career year leads me to believe that the Indians are planning for a drop in production from Casey with the acquisitions of Juan Gonzalez and Jose Hernandez.
Designated 3B/OF Corey Smith for Assignment
Better late than never, I guess. Smith didn't really deserve roster protection last winter, but because of his first-round pedigree, he got it. I would think that he'd be claimed on waivers, but with most of the free agents already signed, a lot of teams may not have the roster spot to spare. Maybe he just needs a change of scenery
Signed RHRP David Riske to one-year, $1.425M contract, avoiding arbitration
A pretty good deal for a reliever who still has excellent stuff. I wouldn't be surprised if he supplants Bob Howry as Wickman's primary setup man next season. I think the days of Riske as closer are probably long gone, but he can be just as valuable in the 8th inning.
Signed 2B Warren Morris and IF Jake Thrower to minor-league contracts
Morris will probably take over Brent Abernathy's role in Buffalo. Given the recent infielder signings, picking Cleveland might not have been the best career move for Warren. As for Thrower, I haven't heard too much about him. His minor-league numbers look fairly pedestrian, and the press release said that he was a utility player with the Angel's AAA affiliate last season. So it looks like he'll be going to Buffalo along with Morris.
Re-signed C Dusty Wathan to a minor-league contract
Wathan might be the Bisons' starting catcher next year, depending on where Ryan Garko is playing positionally. I would think that the Indians want Garko as a catcher if for no other reason than to maximize his value, but he should also see some time at first base, leaving Wathan to fill in the gaps.
I apologize for the short hiatus in posting, but the beginning of the semester has kept me on the run. I'm working on the All-Time pitchers as of this moment, so the Excel sheet should be updated by the weekend.
Believe it or not, this is the first multi-year contract given out by the Indians since the 2001-2002 offseason, when CC Sabathia, Bob Wickman, and Matt Lawton were given contract extensions and Ricky Gutierrez was signed as a free agent. Technically, Aaron Boone's deal is a multi-year contract, but he didn't actually play for the team last season. Given that whoever lost the battle between Brandon Phillips and Jhonny Peralta wasn't going to be a backup, adding Cora to the mix is a nice insurance policy. Hopefully it isn't too attractive to Eric Wedge, who may be tempted to bench Peralta if he goes through an extended slump. If Cora is used like the team says they're going use him, he should be a nice complementary part. In a previous post, I said that Cora's main asset is his defense. He also is a left-handed hitter, which I previously alluded too but failed to mention explicity. Cora's main job should be to give Belliard one or two days off a week, and spot Peralta once in a while. He can be used in a late-inning situation when defense is a priority. Heck, he may become Jake Westbrook's personal infielder.
Whither Brandon Phillips, assuming he does lose out to Peralta? Back to Buffalo, where he'll probably play shortstop most of the time. The Indians have an option on Belliard, but I get the sense that it won't get picked up based on Shapiro said during today's conference call. That leaves second base open to Phillips, Cora, or both in 2006. Unless Brandon Pinckney makes gigantic strides next season, it looks like the job will be Phillips' to lose. Also, Peralta may eventually grow out of the shortstop position, possibly moving to third base, so Phillips, thanks to his quasi-rebound in 2004, still has a future with the club.
Also in today's press conference Shapiro said that Jose Hernandez would be more of utility player, playing first, third, left or even center field against a left-handed pitcher. Blake, although he's a right-handed hitter, tended to struggle against southpaws; he posted an OPS of only .785 against left-handers in 2004, compared to .865 against right-handers. That added to the possibility that 2004 may have been a career year leads me to believe that the Indians are planning for a drop in production from Casey with the acquisitions of Juan Gonzalez and Jose Hernandez.
Designated 3B/OF Corey Smith for Assignment
Better late than never, I guess. Smith didn't really deserve roster protection last winter, but because of his first-round pedigree, he got it. I would think that he'd be claimed on waivers, but with most of the free agents already signed, a lot of teams may not have the roster spot to spare. Maybe he just needs a change of scenery
Signed RHRP David Riske to one-year, $1.425M contract, avoiding arbitration
A pretty good deal for a reliever who still has excellent stuff. I wouldn't be surprised if he supplants Bob Howry as Wickman's primary setup man next season. I think the days of Riske as closer are probably long gone, but he can be just as valuable in the 8th inning.
Signed 2B Warren Morris and IF Jake Thrower to minor-league contracts
Morris will probably take over Brent Abernathy's role in Buffalo. Given the recent infielder signings, picking Cleveland might not have been the best career move for Warren. As for Thrower, I haven't heard too much about him. His minor-league numbers look fairly pedestrian, and the press release said that he was a utility player with the Angel's AAA affiliate last season. So it looks like he'll be going to Buffalo along with Morris.
Re-signed C Dusty Wathan to a minor-league contract
Wathan might be the Bisons' starting catcher next year, depending on where Ryan Garko is playing positionally. I would think that the Indians want Garko as a catcher if for no other reason than to maximize his value, but he should also see some time at first base, leaving Wathan to fill in the gaps.
I apologize for the short hiatus in posting, but the beginning of the semester has kept me on the run. I'm working on the All-Time pitchers as of this moment, so the Excel sheet should be updated by the weekend.
Friday, January 14, 2005
Playing the Percentages
One of the big reasons why Alex Cora is reportedly close to a deal with the Indians is because he would fill a couple roles. I don't think he's going to be signed as a starter, but mostly as a utility guy. If the reports are correct, he'll be getting a two-year deal, which is excessive for the type of role that he'll be playing, but I'll cross that bridge when he actually signs. What I am going to speculate on is how exactly he'll be used.
First of all, let's examine Cora's strengths; after all, the best managers use their players' strengths. Cora is first and foremost a defensive player. He "broke out" offensively this season, posting a .266 EQA with the Dodgers. Now that may have been helped by the fact that Jose Hernandez was platooning with him, but regardless he did hit .264/.364/.380, well above his career averages. He's not going to be the full-time starter at shortstop or second base unless several things happen, all of which are bad for the Indians. That being said, he could reprise his role somewhat as a platoon player and be a productive player. He can spell both Jhonny Peralta and Ronnie Belliard against a tough right-hander, or enter the game as a defensive upgrade over either. He posted a FRAR of 29 and 28 in 2003 and 2004, so think of him as John McDonald with more offense.
So how would this work on the field? Assuming that Peralta is starting at short, and Juan Gonzalez has his back under control, the postion players look like this, with their primary backups in parentheses:
C Victor Martinez (Josh Bard)
1B Ben Broussard (Travis Hafner/Jose Hernandez)
2B Ronnie Belliard (Alex Cora)
SS Jhonny Peralta (Alex Cora/Jose Hernandez)
3B Aaron Boone (Jose Hernandez/Casey Blake)
LF Casey Blake (Ryan Ludwick/Jose Hernandez)
CF Coco Crisp (Ryan Ludwick)
RF Juan Gonzalez (Ryan Ludwick/Jose Hernandez)
DH Travis Hafner
Now these are my guesses, but Eric Wedge may certainly see things differently. It all really hinges on what roles Hernandez and Cora play. If Wedge decides to make Hernandez this year's Lou Merloni (platoon with Broussard), then Cora would fill in at the other infield positions. Maybe Hernandez is the backup at third instead of Blake, or maybe he's Peralta's primary backup. Perhaps the Indians will use Cora similarly to when he was a Dodger, platooning him with Belliard. I see Cora fitting into a more offense/defense type of platoon, where he might be brought in at second or short with a lead late in a game. Hernadez is more of an offensive asset, his role should be as a pinch-hitter who can also play every infield position.
Whenever I hear an interview with Wedge, he reiterates the need to keep the starters fresh; it was pretty obvious that a lot of the regulars simply wore down last season because the bench wasn't that good. Adding Hernandez and Cora to the mix should make resting Peralta, Belliard, or Boone a lot more palatable.
First of all, let's examine Cora's strengths; after all, the best managers use their players' strengths. Cora is first and foremost a defensive player. He "broke out" offensively this season, posting a .266 EQA with the Dodgers. Now that may have been helped by the fact that Jose Hernandez was platooning with him, but regardless he did hit .264/.364/.380, well above his career averages. He's not going to be the full-time starter at shortstop or second base unless several things happen, all of which are bad for the Indians. That being said, he could reprise his role somewhat as a platoon player and be a productive player. He can spell both Jhonny Peralta and Ronnie Belliard against a tough right-hander, or enter the game as a defensive upgrade over either. He posted a FRAR of 29 and 28 in 2003 and 2004, so think of him as John McDonald with more offense.
So how would this work on the field? Assuming that Peralta is starting at short, and Juan Gonzalez has his back under control, the postion players look like this, with their primary backups in parentheses:
C Victor Martinez (Josh Bard)
1B Ben Broussard (Travis Hafner/Jose Hernandez)
2B Ronnie Belliard (Alex Cora)
SS Jhonny Peralta (Alex Cora/Jose Hernandez)
3B Aaron Boone (Jose Hernandez/Casey Blake)
LF Casey Blake (Ryan Ludwick/Jose Hernandez)
CF Coco Crisp (Ryan Ludwick)
RF Juan Gonzalez (Ryan Ludwick/Jose Hernandez)
DH Travis Hafner
Now these are my guesses, but Eric Wedge may certainly see things differently. It all really hinges on what roles Hernandez and Cora play. If Wedge decides to make Hernandez this year's Lou Merloni (platoon with Broussard), then Cora would fill in at the other infield positions. Maybe Hernandez is the backup at third instead of Blake, or maybe he's Peralta's primary backup. Perhaps the Indians will use Cora similarly to when he was a Dodger, platooning him with Belliard. I see Cora fitting into a more offense/defense type of platoon, where he might be brought in at second or short with a lead late in a game. Hernadez is more of an offensive asset, his role should be as a pinch-hitter who can also play every infield position.
Whenever I hear an interview with Wedge, he reiterates the need to keep the starters fresh; it was pretty obvious that a lot of the regulars simply wore down last season because the bench wasn't that good. Adding Hernandez and Cora to the mix should make resting Peralta, Belliard, or Boone a lot more palatable.
Thursday, January 13, 2005
Some Housecleaning
From now to the start of Spring Training is the least active time of year for baseball news. Yeah, the Indians might bring back Dusty Wathan or whoever to be the 5th catcher in camp, but there isn't much going on. I'll use this time to continue ranking the 100 Greatest Indians (the pitchers should appear within the next day or two), post about baseball in general, and get more into what I said on January 2nd. Essentially this is the time of year to do the things I've put off until now.
A couple brief mentions as to some new features. The numbers next to some players' names indicates their rankings on my own unscientific prospect list. No, I don't count Grady Sizemore or Jhonny Peralta as prospects because they've exceeded the threshold for MLB rookie status, which I used to determine prospect status. Here's my list, which for now will remain comment-less:
1. RHP Adam Miller - Age 21 (A+)
2. 1B Michael Aubrey - Age 23 (AA)
3. OF Franklin Gutierrez - Age 22 (AA)
4. C/1B Ryan Garko - Age 24 (AA)
5. RHP Fausto Carmona - Age 21 (AA)
6. OF Brad Snyder - Age 23 (A+)
7. RHP Fernando Cabrera - Age 23 (AAA)
8. RHP Andrew Brown - Age 24 (AA)
9. RHP Jake Dittler - Age 22 (AA)
10. LHP Jeremy Sowers - Age 22 (College)
11. OF Ryan Goleski - Age 23 (A-)
12. RHP Francisco Cruceta - Age 24 (AAA)
13. RHP Nick Pesco - Age 21 (A-)
14. 3B Pat Osborn - Age 24 (A+)
15. OF Jason Cooper - Age 24 (AA)
16. 3B Kevin Kouzmanoff - Age 23 (A-)
17. RHP Justin Hoyman - Age 23 (SSA)
18. LHP Dan Cevette - Age 21 (A-)
19. OF Juan Valdes - Age 20 (A-)
20. LHP Tony Sipp - Age 21 (SSA)
The ages are the players' "baseball ages" for the 2005 season. If the player's birthday is before July 1, his age is 2005-(birth year). If his birthday is July 1 or after, his age is 2005-(birth year)-1. The level in parenthesis is the prospect's highest level of "substantial" playing time. In other words, I count only the levels where there was enough at-bats or innings pitched to make an evaluation. I'll eventually get to comments on each of them, but given that I've only seen about 6 or 7 players in person, what I have to say won't mean that much; I used mainly second-hand reports combined with their statistics to compile this list. If there's a reader who wants to supply a scouting report on any of the above players, by all means send it in, and I'll post your report, giving you the credit.
Also don't forget the Excel worksheet under my 'Links' section. As I continue to rank the 100 Greatest Indians, I'll update the worksheet, so download it early and often (but please but don't use my bandwidth to open it).
A couple brief mentions as to some new features. The numbers next to some players' names indicates their rankings on my own unscientific prospect list. No, I don't count Grady Sizemore or Jhonny Peralta as prospects because they've exceeded the threshold for MLB rookie status, which I used to determine prospect status. Here's my list, which for now will remain comment-less:
1. RHP Adam Miller - Age 21 (A+)
2. 1B Michael Aubrey - Age 23 (AA)
3. OF Franklin Gutierrez - Age 22 (AA)
4. C/1B Ryan Garko - Age 24 (AA)
5. RHP Fausto Carmona - Age 21 (AA)
6. OF Brad Snyder - Age 23 (A+)
7. RHP Fernando Cabrera - Age 23 (AAA)
8. RHP Andrew Brown - Age 24 (AA)
9. RHP Jake Dittler - Age 22 (AA)
10. LHP Jeremy Sowers - Age 22 (College)
11. OF Ryan Goleski - Age 23 (A-)
12. RHP Francisco Cruceta - Age 24 (AAA)
13. RHP Nick Pesco - Age 21 (A-)
14. 3B Pat Osborn - Age 24 (A+)
15. OF Jason Cooper - Age 24 (AA)
16. 3B Kevin Kouzmanoff - Age 23 (A-)
17. RHP Justin Hoyman - Age 23 (SSA)
18. LHP Dan Cevette - Age 21 (A-)
19. OF Juan Valdes - Age 20 (A-)
20. LHP Tony Sipp - Age 21 (SSA)
The ages are the players' "baseball ages" for the 2005 season. If the player's birthday is before July 1, his age is 2005-(birth year). If his birthday is July 1 or after, his age is 2005-(birth year)-1. The level in parenthesis is the prospect's highest level of "substantial" playing time. In other words, I count only the levels where there was enough at-bats or innings pitched to make an evaluation. I'll eventually get to comments on each of them, but given that I've only seen about 6 or 7 players in person, what I have to say won't mean that much; I used mainly second-hand reports combined with their statistics to compile this list. If there's a reader who wants to supply a scouting report on any of the above players, by all means send it in, and I'll post your report, giving you the credit.
Also don't forget the Excel worksheet under my 'Links' section. As I continue to rank the 100 Greatest Indians, I'll update the worksheet, so download it early and often (but please but don't use my bandwidth to open it).
Tuesday, January 11, 2005
Juan Gonzalez Signs
Signed OF Juan Gonzalez to a minor-league contract; Invited him to Spring Training
Regardless of how Bud Shaw wants to spin it, this is a nice deal for the Indians. Gonzalez will return to the scene of his last good season, and hope to resurrect his career. The Indians get to see if he's healthy for half a million dollars and a minor-league deal.
Back to the Shaw piece. Frankly, I just think he had this column in his queue and was waiting for some excuse to use it. Then the Indians signed Kevin Millwood, so he to re-write it a bit and...voila! Dolan is cheap because the Indians are signing injury-prone players. Nevermind that the Yankees signed Jon Lieber two seasons ago post-Tommy John surgery. Nevermind the Red Sox signed both Matt Mantei and Wade Miller this offseason, both of whom have arguably more question marks than Millwood attached. Where did he think Bob Howry came from? Or Scott Sauerbeck?
Well, I guess I'll have to wait until I see a Derek Lowe-type signing until I buy those tickets. After all, it's all about the spending, right?
If I didn't know better, Shaw just insulted the intelligences of the entire Indians fanbase. When the Indians won last year, the fans showed up. If the Indians win this year, fans will show up. They won't show up just because they didn't make an effort to get Carlos Beltran or Pedro Martinez. It's about winning baseball games, not spending money. And until columnists can learn to tell the difference between the two, I fear we'll be getting more pieces like this.
Juan Gonzalez is the type of signing clubs of all payrolls look for. It's not indicative of how cheap the owner is; you could use other arguments much more easily. It's about getting value for your dollar, no matter how big your wallet is. Otherwise, why would the Red Sox even care about Matt Mantei? There are legitimate arguments that Dolan isn't spending as much as he could, but this isn't one of them.
Regardless of how Bud Shaw wants to spin it, this is a nice deal for the Indians. Gonzalez will return to the scene of his last good season, and hope to resurrect his career. The Indians get to see if he's healthy for half a million dollars and a minor-league deal.
Back to the Shaw piece. Frankly, I just think he had this column in his queue and was waiting for some excuse to use it. Then the Indians signed Kevin Millwood, so he to re-write it a bit and...voila! Dolan is cheap because the Indians are signing injury-prone players. Nevermind that the Yankees signed Jon Lieber two seasons ago post-Tommy John surgery. Nevermind the Red Sox signed both Matt Mantei and Wade Miller this offseason, both of whom have arguably more question marks than Millwood attached. Where did he think Bob Howry came from? Or Scott Sauerbeck?
Dolan will have to spend serious money first to make serious contention happen.
The Indians aren't going anywhere you'd identify as a dream destination with the 25th or 26th highest payroll.
Baseball's economy isn't suddenly going to get friendly enough to improve that standing significantly, so it's all on Dolan - as it should be in a town that set an unmatchable sellout streak at Jacobs Field.
Well, I guess I'll have to wait until I see a Derek Lowe-type signing until I buy those tickets. After all, it's all about the spending, right?
The only hope of raising revenues significantly this season is a hell-on-wheels start. To take the city by storm, the Indians must take the division by storm. Even then, April and May are tough sells at the turnstile and could be tougher with LeBron James and the Cavaliers in the playoffs.
If I didn't know better, Shaw just insulted the intelligences of the entire Indians fanbase. When the Indians won last year, the fans showed up. If the Indians win this year, fans will show up. They won't show up just because they didn't make an effort to get Carlos Beltran or Pedro Martinez. It's about winning baseball games, not spending money. And until columnists can learn to tell the difference between the two, I fear we'll be getting more pieces like this.
Juan Gonzalez is the type of signing clubs of all payrolls look for. It's not indicative of how cheap the owner is; you could use other arguments much more easily. It's about getting value for your dollar, no matter how big your wallet is. Otherwise, why would the Red Sox even care about Matt Mantei? There are legitimate arguments that Dolan isn't spending as much as he could, but this isn't one of them.
Saturday, January 08, 2005
It's Finally Done
Signed RHSP Kevin Millwood to a one year, $7M contract
The contract is technically worth $7M, but the Indians are only on the hook for $3M if Millwood gets hurt. The other $4M is a "signing bonus," contingent on Millwood's pitching arm. If he spends 20 or more days on the disabled list because of an arm injury, 1/183rd of that signing bonus goes away for every subsequent day Millwood is on the DL. If you're wondering where the 183 comes from, that refers to the number of days in a baseball season. So if Millwood pulls a Bere and doesn't pitch at all, the Indians owe him $3M. If he pitches less than 190 innings but his arm holds up, they owe him $7M. Millwood can also earn an extra $1M in performance bonuses according to Andy Call of the Repository. The bonuses are mainly based on innings pitched.
This is an outstanding deal for both sides. Millwood didn't get the attention other pitchers got because of his elbow, and is now in a situation where he can re-enter the market next season and cash in. The Indians get a pitcher who, when he's healthy, is at the very least a solid number 3 starter for a one year deal with very little financial risk. Baseball Prospectus, whose work I generally like, panned the deal even before it happened. They compared Millwood to Wade Miller, who also signed an incentive-laden contract this offseason, stating that paying Millwood $7M is too much. Frankly (and I say this as a subscriber to BPro), I disagree. Here's their argument:
The experience comment is a red herring, in my opinion. All the Indians were looking for is starting pitching help for 2005, preferrably from a pitcher who was healthy. The difference between Millwood's and Miller's years of service probably had little to do with their respective contract offers; their injuries did (Miller has a shoulder problem, and Millwood's injury was with his elbow). The Indians put Millwood through what I can safely call an exhaustive battery of medical tests to make sure Millwood's arm was healthy, and further covered their bases with the non-guaranteed signing bonus. Stating that the Indians are offering Millwood more money than Miller just because he's pitched more innings doesn't really make sense to me. And since both contracts are a season apiece, does age really matter? Of course, Prospectus may change its tune when they see the details of the contract, but even at $7M I don't mind the deal at all.
The contract is technically worth $7M, but the Indians are only on the hook for $3M if Millwood gets hurt. The other $4M is a "signing bonus," contingent on Millwood's pitching arm. If he spends 20 or more days on the disabled list because of an arm injury, 1/183rd of that signing bonus goes away for every subsequent day Millwood is on the DL. If you're wondering where the 183 comes from, that refers to the number of days in a baseball season. So if Millwood pulls a Bere and doesn't pitch at all, the Indians owe him $3M. If he pitches less than 190 innings but his arm holds up, they owe him $7M. Millwood can also earn an extra $1M in performance bonuses according to Andy Call of the Repository. The bonuses are mainly based on innings pitched.
This is an outstanding deal for both sides. Millwood didn't get the attention other pitchers got because of his elbow, and is now in a situation where he can re-enter the market next season and cash in. The Indians get a pitcher who, when he's healthy, is at the very least a solid number 3 starter for a one year deal with very little financial risk. Baseball Prospectus, whose work I generally like, panned the deal even before it happened. They compared Millwood to Wade Miller, who also signed an incentive-laden contract this offseason, stating that paying Millwood $7M is too much. Frankly (and I say this as a subscriber to BPro), I disagree. Here's their argument:
Miller and Millwood were fairly comparable in 2002-03 (combined VORP of 67.4 for Millwood and 60.7 for Miller). Both ran into arm trouble last year and missed a considerable number of starts. When they did pitch, though, Miller was superior, boasting a VORP of 21.8 to Millwood's 9.3. Both have comparable strikeout rates (within a quarter-K per nine). Miller is two years younger.
Millwood, of course, has more "experience." Now, if they were in the first few years in the bigs and playing at the major-league minimum, then experience would count because it's codified in the Collective Bargaining Agreement to be that way. It doesn't have to be that way in the unprotected, free-wheeling, every-man-for-himself world of free agency, though. If the Indians want to reward Millwood for having pitched in the big leagues longer than Miller or because he ripped it up real good back in 1999, then give him an additional 500 EBFB (extra big fun bucks). To our way of thinking, the Red Sox established what the market value is for moderately successful starting pitchers coming off injuries is when they signed Miller to one year at $1.5 mil. Because of that, anything beyond $2 million for Millwood is excessive on the Indians' part.
The experience comment is a red herring, in my opinion. All the Indians were looking for is starting pitching help for 2005, preferrably from a pitcher who was healthy. The difference between Millwood's and Miller's years of service probably had little to do with their respective contract offers; their injuries did (Miller has a shoulder problem, and Millwood's injury was with his elbow). The Indians put Millwood through what I can safely call an exhaustive battery of medical tests to make sure Millwood's arm was healthy, and further covered their bases with the non-guaranteed signing bonus. Stating that the Indians are offering Millwood more money than Miller just because he's pitched more innings doesn't really make sense to me. And since both contracts are a season apiece, does age really matter? Of course, Prospectus may change its tune when they see the details of the contract, but even at $7M I don't mind the deal at all.
Thursday, January 06, 2005
Millwood, Almonte, and....Juan Gonzalez?
It looks like things are starting to happen with Kevin Millwood and his agent, Scott Boras. WTAM and AP writer Tom Withers are both saying that Millwood is close to signing with the Indians for about $7M plus incentives. The Indians put Millwood's arm under the microscope, and apparently they're satisfied that he'll be healthy for 2005. Millwood would probably slot behind CC Sabathia and Jake Westbrook in the rotation, although I think Millwood should be better than Jake. This would also move Jason Davis to the bullpen, where he may be more effective. If the Indians can get 210 innings out of Millwood, they'd have to be thrilled. If he gets injured, the rotation's in trouble in 2005, but they also won't have his salary on the books in 2006. I'd really like for there to be a team option for next year...maybe $8-9M, but Boras is probably smarter than that; If Millwood is good enough to warrant the Indians picking up the option, he could get much more money (and years) from another team. Either way, it's a nice value signing for the Indians.
The other day, the Indians announced they had sold Erick Almonte to the Nippon Ham Fighters of the Japanese Pacific League. For Almonte, this is a great move; he'll make a lot more money in Japan, and could parlay a good season in Japan to a major-league deal next season. For the Indians, they lose their Plan C shortstop. He would have been a nice 25th man, or at the very least a fallback in Buffalo.
Now what about Juan Gonzalez? I'll admit that bringing Juan back didn't even enter the picture when thinking about who the Indians would target. If it's a minor-league deal, great; the team gets to see if Juan's back is fine, and see how he looks. What I can't understand is where he'd fit in if he does make the club. Justice B. Hill speculates that Coco Crisp would move to center, and Grady Sizemore would be optioned to Buffalo. I don't see that happening unless Sizemore is hurt; Grady is ready for the majors, and sending him back to AAA wouldn't do much good at all. Juan could be Aaron Boone insurance; if Boone couldn't play early in the season, Casey Blake would move back to third, and Juan would take over in right. Or maybe the Indians want him to challenge Ryan Ludwick for the backup outfielder's job. Given his durability issues, a part-time role might work out; but Juan has never had any real platoon splits. I guess I'll have to hold judgment until I see how the Indians envision Juan's role on the team if he makes the club.
Finally, John at 'Till You're Blue in the Face has his Michael Aubrey scouting report up. While you're there, check his other prospect reports out. Also, I'd like to welcome to the Indians blogosphere Knuckleball Sandwich and Tribe Report. Hopefully you'll make them part of your daily surf.
The other day, the Indians announced they had sold Erick Almonte to the Nippon Ham Fighters of the Japanese Pacific League. For Almonte, this is a great move; he'll make a lot more money in Japan, and could parlay a good season in Japan to a major-league deal next season. For the Indians, they lose their Plan C shortstop. He would have been a nice 25th man, or at the very least a fallback in Buffalo.
Now what about Juan Gonzalez? I'll admit that bringing Juan back didn't even enter the picture when thinking about who the Indians would target. If it's a minor-league deal, great; the team gets to see if Juan's back is fine, and see how he looks. What I can't understand is where he'd fit in if he does make the club. Justice B. Hill speculates that Coco Crisp would move to center, and Grady Sizemore would be optioned to Buffalo. I don't see that happening unless Sizemore is hurt; Grady is ready for the majors, and sending him back to AAA wouldn't do much good at all. Juan could be Aaron Boone insurance; if Boone couldn't play early in the season, Casey Blake would move back to third, and Juan would take over in right. Or maybe the Indians want him to challenge Ryan Ludwick for the backup outfielder's job. Given his durability issues, a part-time role might work out; but Juan has never had any real platoon splits. I guess I'll have to hold judgment until I see how the Indians envision Juan's role on the team if he makes the club.
Finally, John at 'Till You're Blue in the Face has his Michael Aubrey scouting report up. While you're there, check his other prospect reports out. Also, I'd like to welcome to the Indians blogosphere Knuckleball Sandwich and Tribe Report. Hopefully you'll make them part of your daily surf.
Tuesday, January 04, 2005
The Hall of Fame Voting
Today the Baseball Writers Association voted two players into the Hall of Fame: Wade Boggs and Ryne Sandberg. Both are well deserving players, but there's two others that I felt were snubbed. For whatever reason, Bert Blyleven and Alan Trammell haven't got the traction that they should have by now, and I really don't understand why. Well, given that these are baseball writers voting, nothing ever really surprises me, but let me state their cases, and you can be the judge.
Bert Blyleven (1970-1992)
Career PRAR: 1496
Career WARP3: 139.3
Career Strikeouts: 3701 (5th All-Time)
Career ERA+: 118
Complete Games: 242
Shutouts: 60 (9th All-Time)
Given that Blyleven, if he's ever voted in, would become one of the better pitchers enshrined in the Hall, the lack of attention just mystifies me. One of the only knocks on Bert is his 250 losses, but that in no way makes Blyleven a worse pitcher. It's not really his fault that he played on really bad teams during his tenure. All a pitcher can control when on the mound is himself; he cannot control how many runs his team scores, or how effective his bullpen is, or how good the defense behind him is. To not vote for Blyleven based on his career record is asinine. And that's what about 60% of the voters did this year.
Only eight pitchers have more shutouts than Blyleven: Walter Johnson, Grover Cleveland Alexander, Christy Mathewson, Cy Young, Eddie Plank, Warren Spahn, Nolan Ryan, and Tom Seaver. All of them are in the Hall of Fame. The next THIRTEEN pitchers on the list are in the Hall of Fame.
Only four pitchers have more strikeouts than Blyleven: Nolan Ryan, Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson, and Steve Carlton. All are Hall of Famers or certain Hall of Famers. The next NINE pitchers on the list are in the Hall of Fame or a certain Hall of Famer (Greg Maddux).
I've yet to hear a cogent argument why Blyleven should not be in the Hall, yet the voters keep leaving him off their ballots.
Allen Trammell (1977-1996)
Career BRAR: 422
Career FRAR: 460
Career WARP3: 114.2
Career OPS+: 110
During his career, Trammell was one of the best shortstops in the game. He finished in the MVP voting thrice, finishing second in 1987. He won four Gold Gloves. In an era where an offensive shortstop wasn't commonplace, Trammell was a true offensive weapon. He won a championship with the Tigers in 1984, and was the World Series MVP, so the "winning" arguments some use against Blyleven don't apply to him. I guess the fact that not only do the voters not vote him in, but leave him off so many ballots altogether bugs me the most; Trammel only appeared on 16.9% of the ballots, and writers may vote for ten players each year. Trammell's double play partner, Lou Whitaker, dropped off the ballot in his first year of eligibility, which to me smacks of an unintended consequence of some writers not believing Whitaker a "first-ballot Hall of Famer", thus leaving him off their ballots. Yes, Whitaker failed to receive 5% of the vote.
Yes, I'd rather the Hall of Fame keep its standards high, so that marginal players don't sneak in; lowering the percentage for induction is not a solution. But by the same token, when (in my estimation) no-brainers continually get shut out, I start to wonder whether some voters really take their votes seriously.
Bert Blyleven (1970-1992)
Career PRAR: 1496
Career WARP3: 139.3
Career Strikeouts: 3701 (5th All-Time)
Career ERA+: 118
Complete Games: 242
Shutouts: 60 (9th All-Time)
Given that Blyleven, if he's ever voted in, would become one of the better pitchers enshrined in the Hall, the lack of attention just mystifies me. One of the only knocks on Bert is his 250 losses, but that in no way makes Blyleven a worse pitcher. It's not really his fault that he played on really bad teams during his tenure. All a pitcher can control when on the mound is himself; he cannot control how many runs his team scores, or how effective his bullpen is, or how good the defense behind him is. To not vote for Blyleven based on his career record is asinine. And that's what about 60% of the voters did this year.
Only eight pitchers have more shutouts than Blyleven: Walter Johnson, Grover Cleveland Alexander, Christy Mathewson, Cy Young, Eddie Plank, Warren Spahn, Nolan Ryan, and Tom Seaver. All of them are in the Hall of Fame. The next THIRTEEN pitchers on the list are in the Hall of Fame.
Only four pitchers have more strikeouts than Blyleven: Nolan Ryan, Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson, and Steve Carlton. All are Hall of Famers or certain Hall of Famers. The next NINE pitchers on the list are in the Hall of Fame or a certain Hall of Famer (Greg Maddux).
I've yet to hear a cogent argument why Blyleven should not be in the Hall, yet the voters keep leaving him off their ballots.
Allen Trammell (1977-1996)
Career BRAR: 422
Career FRAR: 460
Career WARP3: 114.2
Career OPS+: 110
During his career, Trammell was one of the best shortstops in the game. He finished in the MVP voting thrice, finishing second in 1987. He won four Gold Gloves. In an era where an offensive shortstop wasn't commonplace, Trammell was a true offensive weapon. He won a championship with the Tigers in 1984, and was the World Series MVP, so the "winning" arguments some use against Blyleven don't apply to him. I guess the fact that not only do the voters not vote him in, but leave him off so many ballots altogether bugs me the most; Trammel only appeared on 16.9% of the ballots, and writers may vote for ten players each year. Trammell's double play partner, Lou Whitaker, dropped off the ballot in his first year of eligibility, which to me smacks of an unintended consequence of some writers not believing Whitaker a "first-ballot Hall of Famer", thus leaving him off their ballots. Yes, Whitaker failed to receive 5% of the vote.
Yes, I'd rather the Hall of Fame keep its standards high, so that marginal players don't sneak in; lowering the percentage for induction is not a solution. But by the same token, when (in my estimation) no-brainers continually get shut out, I start to wonder whether some voters really take their votes seriously.
Sunday, January 02, 2005
My Resolution
The start of anything new offers you a great opportunity for introspection. Given that I've never really said what this blog is about, the dawn of a new year is as good a time as any.
First of all, let me start out by saying that I'm a baseball fan first, and an Indians fan second. What that means: I'm probably as passionate about the Tribe as anyone I've met, but that passion stems from a love of baseball in general. The fact that I grew up in Northeast Ohio just means I happened to become a fan of the Indians. And that wasn't real easy given that my first recollections of the Indians was watching the 1985 team on WUAB. Of course watching the next, oh, decade of Indians baseball wasn't that great either, but I guess it gave me a sort of tolerance for awful teams that others may not have. Every time someone writes the PD complaining about the Indians, I laugh and remember 1991. The Internet (at least as we know it now) wasn't around, but if it was, I could imagine the weeping and gnashing of teeth. Heck, John Hart was just starting to implement his rebuilding plan (the 20th or so version since 1959), and although the talent was definitely there in retrospect, the results on the field didn't show it. That was the season I really got into Indians baseball, the year I would listen or watch as many games as I could. You could say that I picked the wrong year to start closely paying attention to the team, but I was more fascinated in the game itself, the intracacies that baseball alone could offer. That I loved watching a 57-105 team speaks volumes about the sport itself, and since then nothing, including player strikes, owner lockouts, steroids, Jose Mesa, Interleague play, All-Star games which ended in ties, and the New York Yankees could make me give it up.
I'm fascinated with baseball mainly because it's run so differently than other sports. It's not a TV-friendly sport like football is. It's not as flashy as the NBA is, and not as brutal (in a nice way) as the NHL. It features a lot of guys mostly standing around on a field waiting for one guy to throw a ball. But the farther you delve into the sport, the more it sucks you in. The immense strategy it offers, the dizzying numbers of statistics, the massive number of players to keep track of, it's storied and relevent history to study, and sometimes, its indescribable beauty has kept me interested since then.
The dismantling of the team starting in 2002 gave me the impetus to start what eventually became this blog, because it allowed me to revisit the rebuilding I grew up watching. Will this scheme work just like the Hank Peters/John Hart plan? No, because it's different; even if it succeeds, it will succeed in different ways from the mostly organic approach employed in the early 1990s. Hart exploited the six years of control a team has over a player to perfection through his long-term contracts, but really couldn't adapt afterwards. Mark Shapiro has employed a sort of hybrid between the Athletics plan of exploiting market inefficiencies through statistical analysis and the more traditional scouting concepts that clubs like the Atlanta Braves have used for years. Gone are the long-term deals for the most part; Shapiro is more willing to go to arbitration instead. If Westbrook, Blake, or Riske do so, it would be the first case since...you guessed it...1991. The Indians aren't really a Moneyball organization, but aren't a pure tools organization, either. Both concepts (or even a hybrid of the two) will work if executed correctly; the Twins and Athletics are great examples of teams that have won using drastically different methods. The key is to determine what works for your organization, execute it, and be consistent with it. That in my opinion is what every successful organization does. And that's why each GM can succeed with different environments, characteristics, and preferences.
So where does this blog fit in? It, in essence, is the pursuit of determining how exactly a baseball organization in today's environment can win. Yes, I give you my uneducated view on player moves after they happen, but the most instructive analysis in my opinion when you step back, add some context, and look objectively at a baseball organization. Too often I think we look at something in isolation and extrapolate an opinion from so minute a sample that it's worthless. So while I definitely focus on the present, I mix in some of that all-important context from time to time; that means asking and trying to answer larger questions. Right now, one of those larger questions that has been brought to the forefront is a player's value based on past performance. Or in other words, how much money is a Jaret Wright or a Carl Pavano really worth, given their fairly short periods of success? And is it worth overpaying for them, given a small payroll? Examining current trends in baseball is just as important; for example, the San Francisco Giants have decided to forego draft picks in an attempt to win now. Will that work, and what would be the long-term effects of their version of the early 1970s Washington Redskins? Again, it might work for the Giants, who happen to have one the best players in baseball history nearing retirement, but it might be disastrous for other teams on the other side of the Success Cycle. I think looking at the broader picture is a lot more interesting than micro-analyzing who got lost in the AAA portion of the Rule 5 Draft. I can do both, but there's really only so much I can say about a 25-year-old minor-league reliever without repeating myself.
That's where context comes in. Baseball has a lot of history, and if you can harness it, you can come up with some interesting conclusions. Yes, each player presents his own unique traits that sometimes defies prediction, but the more you delve into what makes a prospect turn into a major-league star, you can start to see patterns emerge. And going up a level, you can start to see characteristics of successful organizations. Though sportswriters today aren't really expected to step back a little when examining a club, I think it's a necessary ingredient for thoughtful analysis. It's much easier to criticize a player during an 0-30 slump than to say that, given his career numbers, he'll be all right. The former sells newspapers, and the latter just sounds like a hedge. But that's what baseball is about; a batting average doesn't care that you went through a horrid hitting slump in August, it just cares that you hit .290 for the entire season. Baseball is about context and bodies of work, not one play during a Sunday matinee in June.
To take things to a higher level, organizational moves are also best viewed in context, but that may mean waiting a long period of time before reaching a conclusion. When the Indians started to sell off players in 2002, it was certainly easy to declare the club was going back to the Dark Ages of the 70s and 80s because there was no real hard data to refute it, beyond minor-league data and faith. When the Indians signed Ronnie Belliard instead of Todd Walker, the move was roundly criticized (no pun intended). Now that he's back for another season, the move was mostly lauded. Hindsight is a tool easily used and easily abused; foresight is elusive and, if used properly, deadly. Moneyball wasn't really about OBP per se; it was about finding undervalued commodities and using them to your advantage. Determining what's undervalued is one of a GM's hardest jobs. The Indians use a computer system called DiamondView to help out with the number crunching, but deciding what to target given the teams' needs can't be determined by a computer printout; it takes the aforementioned foresight in concert with experience and sometimes just plain old luck to get a player like Belliard for $1M. That's how teams with low payrolls can get better players than teams with higher payrolls. Another way of course is by drafting them; an organization controls a player for 6 years if they can develop them. That 6 years of control is a key reason why a well-stocked farm system is almost imperative for lower-payroll teams to win in today's financial environment. To collect a lot of cheap, young talent, you have to draft or sign it, and this time you're essentially on a level playing field with the whales of baseball. So you again must find undervalued (as far as talent goes) players and draft them, but this time you take the same amount of risk as the big boys. The reasoning behind a player move is just as important than the move itself; otherwise, why not use a random number generator to build your team?
Whether the current "Blueprint for Success" actually succeeds on the field, where a GM is ultimately evaluated, is relevant only to the extent that we can say why or why not it suceeded. That "why" question is the main reason I'm here, and hopefully we'll answer it together.
First of all, let me start out by saying that I'm a baseball fan first, and an Indians fan second. What that means: I'm probably as passionate about the Tribe as anyone I've met, but that passion stems from a love of baseball in general. The fact that I grew up in Northeast Ohio just means I happened to become a fan of the Indians. And that wasn't real easy given that my first recollections of the Indians was watching the 1985 team on WUAB. Of course watching the next, oh, decade of Indians baseball wasn't that great either, but I guess it gave me a sort of tolerance for awful teams that others may not have. Every time someone writes the PD complaining about the Indians, I laugh and remember 1991. The Internet (at least as we know it now) wasn't around, but if it was, I could imagine the weeping and gnashing of teeth. Heck, John Hart was just starting to implement his rebuilding plan (the 20th or so version since 1959), and although the talent was definitely there in retrospect, the results on the field didn't show it. That was the season I really got into Indians baseball, the year I would listen or watch as many games as I could. You could say that I picked the wrong year to start closely paying attention to the team, but I was more fascinated in the game itself, the intracacies that baseball alone could offer. That I loved watching a 57-105 team speaks volumes about the sport itself, and since then nothing, including player strikes, owner lockouts, steroids, Jose Mesa, Interleague play, All-Star games which ended in ties, and the New York Yankees could make me give it up.
I'm fascinated with baseball mainly because it's run so differently than other sports. It's not a TV-friendly sport like football is. It's not as flashy as the NBA is, and not as brutal (in a nice way) as the NHL. It features a lot of guys mostly standing around on a field waiting for one guy to throw a ball. But the farther you delve into the sport, the more it sucks you in. The immense strategy it offers, the dizzying numbers of statistics, the massive number of players to keep track of, it's storied and relevent history to study, and sometimes, its indescribable beauty has kept me interested since then.
The dismantling of the team starting in 2002 gave me the impetus to start what eventually became this blog, because it allowed me to revisit the rebuilding I grew up watching. Will this scheme work just like the Hank Peters/John Hart plan? No, because it's different; even if it succeeds, it will succeed in different ways from the mostly organic approach employed in the early 1990s. Hart exploited the six years of control a team has over a player to perfection through his long-term contracts, but really couldn't adapt afterwards. Mark Shapiro has employed a sort of hybrid between the Athletics plan of exploiting market inefficiencies through statistical analysis and the more traditional scouting concepts that clubs like the Atlanta Braves have used for years. Gone are the long-term deals for the most part; Shapiro is more willing to go to arbitration instead. If Westbrook, Blake, or Riske do so, it would be the first case since...you guessed it...1991. The Indians aren't really a Moneyball organization, but aren't a pure tools organization, either. Both concepts (or even a hybrid of the two) will work if executed correctly; the Twins and Athletics are great examples of teams that have won using drastically different methods. The key is to determine what works for your organization, execute it, and be consistent with it. That in my opinion is what every successful organization does. And that's why each GM can succeed with different environments, characteristics, and preferences.
So where does this blog fit in? It, in essence, is the pursuit of determining how exactly a baseball organization in today's environment can win. Yes, I give you my uneducated view on player moves after they happen, but the most instructive analysis in my opinion when you step back, add some context, and look objectively at a baseball organization. Too often I think we look at something in isolation and extrapolate an opinion from so minute a sample that it's worthless. So while I definitely focus on the present, I mix in some of that all-important context from time to time; that means asking and trying to answer larger questions. Right now, one of those larger questions that has been brought to the forefront is a player's value based on past performance. Or in other words, how much money is a Jaret Wright or a Carl Pavano really worth, given their fairly short periods of success? And is it worth overpaying for them, given a small payroll? Examining current trends in baseball is just as important; for example, the San Francisco Giants have decided to forego draft picks in an attempt to win now. Will that work, and what would be the long-term effects of their version of the early 1970s Washington Redskins? Again, it might work for the Giants, who happen to have one the best players in baseball history nearing retirement, but it might be disastrous for other teams on the other side of the Success Cycle. I think looking at the broader picture is a lot more interesting than micro-analyzing who got lost in the AAA portion of the Rule 5 Draft. I can do both, but there's really only so much I can say about a 25-year-old minor-league reliever without repeating myself.
That's where context comes in. Baseball has a lot of history, and if you can harness it, you can come up with some interesting conclusions. Yes, each player presents his own unique traits that sometimes defies prediction, but the more you delve into what makes a prospect turn into a major-league star, you can start to see patterns emerge. And going up a level, you can start to see characteristics of successful organizations. Though sportswriters today aren't really expected to step back a little when examining a club, I think it's a necessary ingredient for thoughtful analysis. It's much easier to criticize a player during an 0-30 slump than to say that, given his career numbers, he'll be all right. The former sells newspapers, and the latter just sounds like a hedge. But that's what baseball is about; a batting average doesn't care that you went through a horrid hitting slump in August, it just cares that you hit .290 for the entire season. Baseball is about context and bodies of work, not one play during a Sunday matinee in June.
To take things to a higher level, organizational moves are also best viewed in context, but that may mean waiting a long period of time before reaching a conclusion. When the Indians started to sell off players in 2002, it was certainly easy to declare the club was going back to the Dark Ages of the 70s and 80s because there was no real hard data to refute it, beyond minor-league data and faith. When the Indians signed Ronnie Belliard instead of Todd Walker, the move was roundly criticized (no pun intended). Now that he's back for another season, the move was mostly lauded. Hindsight is a tool easily used and easily abused; foresight is elusive and, if used properly, deadly. Moneyball wasn't really about OBP per se; it was about finding undervalued commodities and using them to your advantage. Determining what's undervalued is one of a GM's hardest jobs. The Indians use a computer system called DiamondView to help out with the number crunching, but deciding what to target given the teams' needs can't be determined by a computer printout; it takes the aforementioned foresight in concert with experience and sometimes just plain old luck to get a player like Belliard for $1M. That's how teams with low payrolls can get better players than teams with higher payrolls. Another way of course is by drafting them; an organization controls a player for 6 years if they can develop them. That 6 years of control is a key reason why a well-stocked farm system is almost imperative for lower-payroll teams to win in today's financial environment. To collect a lot of cheap, young talent, you have to draft or sign it, and this time you're essentially on a level playing field with the whales of baseball. So you again must find undervalued (as far as talent goes) players and draft them, but this time you take the same amount of risk as the big boys. The reasoning behind a player move is just as important than the move itself; otherwise, why not use a random number generator to build your team?
Whether the current "Blueprint for Success" actually succeeds on the field, where a GM is ultimately evaluated, is relevant only to the extent that we can say why or why not it suceeded. That "why" question is the main reason I'm here, and hopefully we'll answer it together.
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